This paper merges two theoretical perspectives in a mathematical game-theoretic modeling approach: industrial organization on the one hand, which basically is the economic theory of market competition and firm strategies, and organizational ecology on the other hand, which is a major sociological tradition that studies the evolution of organizational populations.The merger is instrumental in analyzing a key question in strategic organization: what is the role of flexibility, inertia and efficiency in facilitating firm performance in a selection environment, in terms of both profitability and survival? We argue particularly that game theory can offer a mathematical model of organizational ecology. In this paper we explore two modeling examples. The first model introduces production adjustment costs and the second managerial growth preferences in a Cournot duopoly game. Both models support organizational ecology's claim that an inert firm may push a flexible rival from the market. Moreover, four additional results are worth mentioning. First, a firm's profit-enhancing flexibility or inertia profile is contingent upon the market's carrying capacity development. Second, the inert firm may even outperform its flexible rival when the inert market leader faces a cost disadvantage.Third, this may happen in a munificent environment, implying that cut-throat rivalry can be the result of strategic competition only, as it is facilitated by organizational inertia. Fourth, in response to the rival's flexibility or inertia profile, a firm can calculate its profit-maximizing production adjustment cost or managerial growth objective strategy.
Introduction
Organizational ecology (OE) is a sociological theory of what happens to and within populations of organizations. OE has produced an impressive and still rapidly increasing number of empirical studies (Baum and Amburgey, 2002) . For example, the number of studies that have tested density-dependence hypotheses is very large indeed. There is no doubt that the empirical tradition that has been established by OE, is an important enrichment of organization sciences. In recent years, a cry for increased theoretical precision has emerged, however. For example, Baum (1996: 107-8) concludes his close to exhaustive review of OE with a plea for such precision with reference to the need for 'asking new kinds of research questions that develop links with other streams in organization theory'. We believe that the organizational sub-disciplines in economics are specifically promising in this respect. Here we fully agree with Rao (1996: 1280) , who in a special issue of the Academy of Management Journal observed that organizational economics is one area of overlap with OE that remains to be explored. This is precisely what this paper does. In effect, we merge OE with the dominant sub-branch of industrial organization (IO): game theory. We strongly believe that the mathematical tools of game theory are particularly applicable to OE issues. That is, the very nature of game theory makes this modeling technique well-suited to exploring the impact of differences in relative inertia between firms (or between populations) on direct competition and ultimately on firms' profitability and organizational survival .
Thematically, this paper confronts the standard 'flexibility and efficiency favor selection' logic with OE reasoning. Carroll and Harrison (1993: 92) summarize the efficiency-favors-survival story line by arguing that '[t] his logic holds, first, that when an organizational form emerges and spreads, it is because of the form's efficiency and, secondly, that when an organizational form disappears, it is because of its inefficiency'. In a similar vein, advocates of the strategic choice theory argue that flexibility helps a firm to survive in a competitive environment. The theoretical originality of OE comes from the counterintuitive argument that this standard story may not hold true. This is reflected in Freeman's (1977, 1984) path-breaking inertia-selection theory. However, the theory of the consequences of relative (or structural) inertia on organizational survival is still in need of much refinement. In effect, the relationships between relative inertia, organizational size and firm survival are highly complex and ill-understood (Hannan and Freeman, 1989) . This paper presents two examples of game-theoretic models that go into this complicated issue.
The main purpose of this paper is to make a first step into analyzing the inertia-selection nexus, particularly the consequences of inertia on the profitability and survival of organizations, through mathematical models of key theory fragments of OE. To achieve this aim, we adopt a research strategy that is new in the context of OE. More specifically, we will show that important insights on this issue can be gained by inserting two different specifications of the crucial OE concept of inertia into a game-theoretic IO model of competition. Game theory is by now gaining popularity in strategic management as, for instance, two special issues of the Strategic Management Journal (in 1988 and indicate. Additionally, game theory is starting to be applied in the organizational behavior domain as well (Murnighan, 1994; Camerer and Knez, 1996) . To our knowledge, game theory, being the hard core of the economic tradition in modern industrial organization (Tirole, 1988) , has not as yet been applied to central OE issues. Because of the very nature of game theory, being a mathematical tool to analyze strategic interaction in a competitive setting, we believe that this approach is particularly suited to develop a mathematical foundation for OE. Here we complement the earlier application of first-order logic to OE theory fragments (Péli et al., 1994; Péli, 1997; Péli and Masuch, 1997) .
In the first section, we stress the potential synergies which can be realized by cross-fertilizing the insights from OE with the framework of game-theoretic IO. Then we summarize the inertia debate so as to set the scene for presenting five thought-provoking propositions that follow from inertia-related reasoning. The next section introduces the essentials of two game-theoretic Cournot models that incorporate two different sources of relative inertia in a competitiverivalry IO framework. This paper's models specifically focus on production adjustment costs and managerial growth preferences, which prove to be associated with intriguing competitive outcomes. In this context, a number of counterintuitive results of the models will be presented that provide theoretical support for the five inertia-driven propositions. An appraisal and selection of further research issues conclude the paper. In advance, we would like to remark that we have decided not to include a full review of all the relevant IO and OE literature as this would require a two-volume handbook at least. Rather, we highlight the bits of IO and OE theory (and evidence) that facilitate conveying this paper's key message: that IO's game-theoretic apparatus offers rich opportunities to develop in-depth theoretical extensions and refinements in the OE domain. For sure, the models presented here offer just a stepping stone, though hopefully a thought-provoking one, for further work developing a game theory of organizational ecology.
Organizational ecology and industrial organization
We have argued elsewhere that the potentials for cross-fertilization between OE and IO are substantial (Boone and van Witteloostuijn, 1995; van Witteloostuijn, 2000; van Witteloostuijn et al., 1999) . The reason is that understanding the dynamics of industry evolution is an important research issue in both IO and OE, though from different disciplinary and methodological perspectives. Interestingly, OE already incorporates concepts that have a long tradition in (industrial) economics such as concentration and competition, and often reveals a resemblance to economic analysis. Convincing examples are Barnett and Hansen's (1996) red-queen study and Baum and Korn's (1996) competitive dynamics research, which both introduce IO's mutual forbearance notion in an OE-akin longitudinal design. Surprisingly enough, however, such a cross-fertilizing endeavour has not yet been undertaken in the theoretical modeling arena. In our view, this lack of modeling cross-fertilization may well be caused by a key misunderstanding of the merits of IO-research, as expressed in important OE contributions. 1 The misunderstanding resides in the fact that since the 1970s much IO literature has been dominated by the application of game theory to rivalry in oligopolistic markets (Tirole, 1988) . This tradition has produced an impressive number of specific case models that reveal what competitive outcomes emerge under a large variety of different rules of the game. For example, competitive outcomes hinge subtly upon (the interactions among) such features as the number of firms, (non)price rivalry rules, concentration rate, shape of the demand curve, cost (a)symmetries, decision-making order and horizon (in)finiteness. Apparently, the results of this applied game theory depend critically upon the assumptions underlying the game model at hand (Shapiro, 1989; Sutton, 1991) . From this, Hannan and Carroll (1992: 22) comment that '[t] he analytic results apparently lack robustness'. The criticism is that IO scholars have therefore focused their research efforts on specific markets, which allow for adaptation of the oligopoly model to the idiosyncrasies of the specific setting. Of course, this 'ultra-micro work' (Sutton, 1991: 6) impedes understanding the observed statistical regularities across industries. This observed lack of robustness is one of the main reasons why cross-fertilization between IO and OE has not yet occurred (Hannan and Carroll, 1992) . The implied characterization is, however, partly off the target. For example, theoretical and empirical regularities abound in a number of key contributions to the Handbook of Industrial Organization (Schmalensee and Willig, 1989) , examples being the monopolizing impact of commitments (Gilbert, 1989) and the 30 empirical regularities that have emerged from industry studies (Schmalensee, 1989) . The work of Sutton (1991 Sutton ( , 1998 in particular is a convincing case in point: he proves in his masterpieces that game theory can be applied to develop robust predictions on the lower bound of industry concentration, which hold across a wide class of reasonable models (and thus allow application to a broad set of different industries).
Setting aside this misunderstanding, game-theoretic modeling may contribute significantly to OE for three reasons. The first reason relates to differences in the analytical tools that are applied to develop theories of IO and OE. Modern IO theory is mainly based on formal mathematical modeling, whereas OE's foundation is carried on 'natural language'. It is clear that '[i]nconsistency, incoherence, or other defects in logic are difficult to detect when a theory is stated in natural language' (Péli et al., 1994: 571) . In this respect, it is interesting to note that Hannan and Freeman's article 'Structural inertia and organizational change ' (1984) quoted above is formalized in first-order logic, which enabled the discovery of a number of logical defects in their theory of inertia. Obviously, mathematical modeling is one way of avoiding such logical defects. To be honest, OE is not devoid of mathematics, a revealing example being the modeling efforts in Hannan and Carroll (1992) and Carroll and Hannan (2000) . However, these mathematical (non-game theory) exercises still are the exceptions that confirm the rule that OE primarily involves empirical work based upon hypothesis development in natural language.
Secondly, and more important, competition is a central concept in both IO and OE. It is fair to say, however, that the theoretical elaboration of the concept and process of competition in OE is rather limited. OE recognizes that two forms of competition can be distinguished: indirect and direct competition (Barnett and Amburgey, 1990; Hannan and Carroll, 1992) . Indirect or diffuse competition arises from the fact that actors influence each other because they compete for the same limited resources (Hannan and Carroll, 1992) . In other words, '[s]uch competition occurs when organizations reduce another's viability by depleting a limited common supply of resources' (Barnett and Amburgey, 1990: 80) . Note that diffuse competition does not require any social ties between actors. Basically, the argument is that competitive constraints exist whether or not the actors recognize their interdependence as competitors. In contrast, direct competition implies mutual recognition of the salience of the competitive moves of other actors, and is therefore tantamount to conflict or rivalry (Hannan and Carroll, 1992) . Until now, OE research has mainly focused on diffuse competitive processes. As Hannan and Carroll (1992: 190) comment, '[o] ur arguments in this book emphasized diffuse competition, processes that link the life chances of organizations that may or may not interact as direct competitors by, for instance, taking into account each other's actions as rivals. Instead of trying to measure the intensity of diffuse competition, we used arguments about competitive processes to develop implications for the relationship between density and the vital rates of organizational populations.' In our view, a theory which is mainly based on processes of competition (and legitimation, for that matter) should incorporate both diffuse and direct competition. In empirical work, distance measures of competitive intensity are being applied (Barnett and Hansen, 1996) . In the theoretical arena, IO is very informative, as economic theory has a long tradition of describing and modeling many different types of competition, ranging from perfect (diffuse) competition to oligopolistic (direct) competition (Tirole, 1988; Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991) .
Thirdly, although Hannan and Freeman's (1984) argument that selection favors inertia is indeed thought-provoking, the theory of the consequences of inertia (and organizational change) on survival is still in its infancy. In effect, the relationships between relative inertia, organizational size, change and survival appear to be highly complex and ill-understood (Hannan and Freeman, 1989) .
VA N W I T T E L O O S T U I J N E T A L . : TOWA R D A G A M E T H E O RY
Organizational selection operates on many dimensions besides reproducibility of structure. If selection pressures on specific features of structure are sufficiently strong, organizations with the characteristics appropriate to the environment are favored even if they have low levels of reproducibility. By the same token, environments in which change is turbulent and uncertain may not constitute a systematic regime of selection; the traits that are favored may shift frequently enough that no clear trend emerges. Such settings may favor organizational forms that can take quick advantage of new opportunities. The capacity to respond quickly to new opportunities presumably competes with the capacity to perform reliably and accountably. (Hannan and Freeman, 1989: 90) 2 The point is that precise theories of the inertia-selection nexus may deepen our understanding of the underlying mechanisms, which may well be contingent upon industry characteristics and environmental features.
Apart from this fundamental consideration, inertia theory is limited in scope as it neglects the likely influence of inertia on the degree of direct competition between organizations within the same population. That is, relative inertia is not only a precondition and consequence of (selective) competition, as OE argues, but inertia-producing strategies are also an important determinant of the intensity of competitive rivalry. Recall that inertial pressures may stem from a wide variety of external and internal constraints (Hannan and Freeman, 1977) , such as investment in capacity or any other sunk cost, organizational history or culture, limits on the internal information received by decision makers, and (sunk) entry and exit barriers (Hannan and Freeman, 1977; Haveman, 1993) . Game-theoretic modeling on strategic competition suggests that firms consciously manipulate inertia-increasing strategic moves in order to deter entry and to alleviate direct competition. A nice example is the commitment notion (Dixit, 1982; Ghemawat, 1991) : only an irreversible investment, which by the very definition of commitment implies reduced flexibility and thus increased inertia, can operate as a credible strategic move. That is, the credibility of strategic retaliation threats is enhanced by fixing specific profit-maximizing responses tomorrow by launching ditto sunk investment initiatives today. A second, and related, case in point is the incurring of endogenous sunk costs, such as advertising and R&D outlays, to build up market share (Sutton, 1991 (Sutton, , 1998 . For example, Sutton (1991) shows that the competitive escalation of advertising outlays forces second-tier firms to exit and may eventually generate a dual industry structure with a few large and advertising leading firms on the one hand and a large number of small, specialized and nonadvertising firms on the other. Again, it is the sunk nature of (in this case: advertising) investment that drives the results. The key point is that IO has an open eye for the commitmentflexibility trade-off (Spencer and Brander, 1992) , implying that the ex-ante strategic manipulation (implying flexibility today) of sunk investments (implying inertia tomorrow) is a key determinant of ex-post organizational performance. This paper's modeling also has something to say about this trade-off issue by allowing for the calculation of an optimal degree of flexibility or inertia, thus focusing on ex-ante fixing production adjustment costs or managerial incentive systems that maximize firm profits ex-post. But before going into the modeling exercises, the inertia debate is summarized below in more detail.
The inertia debate
The inertia argument
The central tenet in the strategic management literature is that incumbent firms should change their strategies and structures so as to adopt organizational 'blueprints' (Hannan and Freeman, 1977) which facilitate flexibility. For instance, popular thinking argues that firms should replace their 'bureaucratic blueprint' with a highly flexible network type of blueprint (Volberda, 1998) . Other illustrations of this case are studies on organizational decline suggesting that 'strategic paralysis ' (D'Aveni, 1989a) , which is a manifestation of inert strategic behavior, foreshadows organizational failure. Broadly speaking, two important assumptions are implicitly made by adherents of the adaptation (or strategic choice) model of organizational change: first, that organizations are able to implement such radical transformations with success; and second, that flexibility increases profitability and ultimately survival chances. This typical twin of assumptions is clear from standard textbooks on strategic management, such as Johnson and Scholes (2001) . The validity of both strategic choice assumptions, however, can be questioned. 3 The first assumption is not realistic, according to the organizational ecology theory of relative inertia. OE argues that organizations are hard-pressed to adjust their blueprint, as they feature relative inertia: that is, they lag behind changes in the environment (Hannan and Freeman, 1984) . This is not to say that organizations never change, but rather that adjustments are rare and appear only after significant delays. So, organizations tend to be inert relative to environmental turbulence. Additionally, OE suggests that organizational change, if possible at all, does increase the failure rate. The reason is that the impact of changing the core features of an organization is equivalent to creating a new organization. As a consequence, '[o] rganizational change tend[s] to "reset the clock", exposing the organization once again to the "liability of newness"' (Swaminathan and Delacroix, 1991: 681) . Indeed, quite a number of scholars observed that failure rates increased after organizations implemented major structural changes (Freeman and Hannan, 1990; Haveman, 1990; Amburgey et al., 1993) . The bottom line is that '[a] s the large number of regularly occurring organizational failures indicates, adaptation models are limited in their abilities to explain organizational change' (Carroll and Harrison, 1993: 93) . OE therefore argues that organizational change follows mainly from the selective replacement of one organizational blueprint with another, rather than through internal adaptation of individual organizations (Hannan and Freeman, 1989; Carroll and Harrison, 1993) .
The second assumption is based on the general retrospective economic rationality argument, as commonly applied to the rise and fall of organizational forms (Carroll and Harrison, 1993) . This is the argument that efficiency facilitates firms' performance and survival, and the opposite is true of inefficiency. Nowadays, for instance, the new network-type forms of organization are deemed to be highly efficient -due to their flexibility -compared with the old bureaucratic-blueprint organizations (Volberda, 1998) . In our view, such an assumption is somewhat precarious. Although an increasing number of authors speculate that the dynamic network organization will be the main organizational form in the 21st century (Miles and Snow, 1984; Dyer and Ouchi, 1993) , until now almost nothing is known about the circumstances that promote and sustain network forms (Miles and Snow, 1992) . We agree with Powell (1990: 327) that '[a] good deal more research is needed on the durability of networks'. To be sure, we do not suggest that efficiency and flexibility are not important. However, we oppose the simplistic argument that flexibility is the only key to efficiency and (thus) to organizational survival. In many circumstances, that is, the causality chain may take a quite different shape.
In this respect, again, OE offers a very informative opposing benchmark. As already mentioned above, relative inertia (i.e. the opposite of flexibility) is a central concept in the Darwinian selection theory of OE (Hannan and Freeman, 1989; Boone and van Witteloostuijn, 1995) . The argument of relative inertia implies that the outside world selects organizational blueprints, and that the dynamics of diversity can be understood by focusing on the foundation and mortality rates of those blueprints. Moreover, OE posits that inertia is not only a precondition for Darwinian selection, but -even more important -also a consequence (Hannan and Freeman, 1984) . In other words, selection favors organizational forms characterized by relatively inert procedures, structures and strategies. The underlying logic runs as follows (Hannan and Freeman, 1984) . First, organizations have to be reliable: organizations can only be reliable suppliers of goods and services if they operate on the basis of routines that guide their functioning. Second, organizations have to be accountable for their activities and performance. Accountability also requires stable rules and procedures. Third, organizational reliability and accountability can only be guaranteed if organizational structures are highly reproducible. The routines, rules and procedures determining reliability and accountability must stay in place over time. Selection pressures will work in this direction: hence, rigid and viable blueprints are selected (Boeker, 1988) .
The effects of reliability, accountability and reproducibility cumulate in the argument that:
[t]he modern world favors collective actors that can demonstrate or at least reasonably claim a capacity for reliable performance and can account rationally for their actions. So it favors organizations over other kinds of collectives and favors certain kinds of organizations over others, since not all organizations have these properties in equal measure. Selection within organizational populations tends to eliminate organizations with low reliability and accountability . . .Thus we assume that selection in populations of organizations in modern societies favors forms with high reliability of performance and high levels of accountability. (Hannan and Freeman, 1989: 74) We seem to be left with an intriguing contradictory view on the consequences of inertia (or flexibility). Blending the assumptions of the strategic choice framework and OE suggests that firms may be faced with a complex dilemma: that is, they need to be flexible and inert at the same time in order to survive in the long run (Burgelman, 1991) . Moreover, a flexibility-inertia continuum interpretation implies that a trade-off may point to the possible existence of an optimal level of inertia (or flexibility). Unfortunately, although Hannan and Freeman (1984) rightly point to the relevance of the blending and trade-off issues, hardly any systematic research has been done on the central tenets of both research strands.
System, organizational and managerial inertia
Broadly speaking, inertia can operate at three levels of analysis: the system (or population), the organizational and the managerial level. System inertia may be the result of the existence of path dependencies in the competitive process, defined as the situation where prior decisions, choices or actions affect the current and future behavior of the system (Carroll and Harrison, 1993) . In the case of technology, for instance, '[p]ath dependence can occur when adoption of a given technology contains advantages because of the previous number of adopters ' (Carroll and Harrison, 1993: 92) . Such path dependence may lead to the peculiar result that inferior technologies, such as the QWERTY typewriter keyboard, the color television system in the US and the VHS recording technology, become and remain dominant despite the availability of more efficient alternatives (Carroll and Harrison, 1993) . This long-established concept of path dependence is modeled, for instance, on the economic theories of network externalities Shapiro, 1985, 1986; Farrell and Saloner, 1986) . That is, switching costs at the demand side, which result from network economies, may impede firms from introducing superior technologies that impose a high cost on those who deviate from the market standard. Other examples of inertia at the population level are industry exit and entry barriers. This paper focuses on relative inertia as to organizational size. After all, the ultimate reorganization is downsizing. Here, two sources of firm-level size inertia are considered in our game-theoretic models: production adjustment costs and managerial growth preferences. First, the adjustment of production volumes is associated with all kinds of costs, as neither the decrease nor the
increase of a firm's production volume is likely to be costless. This is an example of an inertia source at the organization level. In the first model described below, production adjustment costs are introduced into an otherwise standard IO Cournot model. That is, production expansion and shrinkage are assumed to be associated with additional expenses, on top of the standard production costs per unit. A prominent long-run cost of production flexibility follows from the investment or divestment of capital. This is straightforward investment economics. Additionally, a major short-run cost of production flexibility originates in human resources. If a firm expands output beyond its slack capacity, current employees must engage in overtime or new employees have to be attracted. Both overtime pay and recruitment activity imply additional costs that must be considered before the firm decides on a production expansion. Similarly, a production volume reduction will introduce an adjustment cost when personnel has to be fired. Employment downsizing might be associated with costly redundancy payments, and tends to be associated with motivational decline.
In the economics literature, empirical evidence abounds. In their review of this literature, Hamermesh and Pfann (1996) discuss a large number of empirical studies that have revealed evidence of different shapes for the firm-level employment adjustment cost function. That is, the employment adjustment cost function may be symmetric or asymmetric and linear or non-linear, depending upon the country, industry and period under study. For example, 'Hamermesh (1989) suggests that lumpy costs of adjustment in the manufacturing plants he studies are so large that a shock must alter demand by 60 percent before employment is changed.' So, clearly, the result of such adjustment costs is that firms are more (or less) slow in changing their employment size over the downward (or upward) phase of the business cycle. Similar results have been reported for firm-level investment (capital) demand. The bottom line is that '[b]usinesses change their demand for inputs more slowly than the shocks to input demand warrant. The standard explanation for this slow adjustment is that, because the firm must incur adjustment costs that are inherent in the act of changing the amount of the input used, the response to shocks will not be instantaneous' (Hamermesh and Pfann, 1996: 1264) . This evidence, however, only goes halfway. The literature is silent about the issue of intra-industry heterogeneity or homogeneity in terms of adjustment cost or organizational inertia.
In the management literature, complementary evidence can be found for inter-firm differences in terms of adjustment. Here, studies of human resource management practices are illustrative. In his single-country (US) study, Huselid (1995) revealed that firms differ in their choice for high-or low-commitment human resource management practices. High-commitment human resource management practices are relatively expensive as a result of the emphasis on such policies as high salaries and long-term contracts. In contrast, low-commitment human resource management practices are relatively cheap, with low salaries and short-term contracts. In their multi-country comparative study, Gooderham et al. (1999) report significant and systematic cross-country heterogeneity of human resource management practices. Expensive 'collaborative' human resource management practices dominate in Denmark, Germany and Norway, but cheap 'calculative' counterparts are typical of France, Spain and the UK. Similarly, the (role of) costs of capital differ from firm to firm as a result of country-specific investment institutions and firm-specific credit ratings (Thomas III and Waring, 1999) .
Another source of inter-firm inertia variation may be the well-established phenomenon of resistance to change on an organization's work floor, as treated in every textbook on organizational behavior (e.g. Robbins, 2001) . A clear case of organizational inertia is caused by retrenchment costs, an issue much studied in the literature on organizational decline (van Witteloostuijn, 1998 , for a recent review). Downsizing comes with high political costs because of resistance from those organizational participants -work floor and management -who are confronted with retrenchment, whereas expansion tends to be received with applause by those who may grow. This relates to inertia at the managerial level. In the second model described here, the managerial inertia argument is translated into the assumption that a manager of a firm maximizes a combination of profit and sales, which implies a deviation from the orthodox profit-maximizing assumption that is so dominant in IO economics. We focus on one specific form of asymmetric managerial inertia: that is, that key actors like to manage growing firms in terms of sales, but they hate to downsize. This implies asymmetric inertia, because the positive utility from sales growth impedes the management's incentive to downsize but increases its willingness to expand, even if this implies that profit is sacrificed. So a growth-loving manager is willing to accept that increases in sales volume come at the expense of profit. But downward inertia implies a cost of change in the sense that a reduction of sales volume produces a disutility for the management of the firm. Hence, this managerial sales incentive induces inertia-consistent behavior over time by imposing a barrier to retrenchment that keeps the firm from downsizing in times of competitive or economic downturn.
The empirical validity of this crucial behavioral assumption is firmly established in organizational research. A number of interesting studies have appeared in both the economic and sociological literature. On the issue of sales growth motives Scherer and Ross (1990: 50) , for example, argue that 'although executive salaries and bonuses are correlated with both firm size and the level of profits, the size correlations tend to be the stronger of the two. Consequently, executives might be willing to sacrifice profitability at the margin to enhance sales and hence compensation' (emphases added). Similarly, the well-known industrial organization theorist Tirole (1988: 34-5) points to 'a widespread feeling that in practice . . . managers have other objectives (e.g. maximizing the firm's size and growth and the perquisites of the managerial position) . . . For instance, the shareholders' incomplete information . . . may allow the managers to inflate the need for personnel' (emphases added). This 'feeling' has long been recognized in the
organization sciences literature, as is clear from the classic work on goal conflict by Cyert and March (1963) and the continuing attention to motivational and goal setting issues in textbooks on organizational behavior (Robbins, 2001) and strategic management (Johnson and Scholes, 2001) .
From an empirical angle, cumulative evidence supports the claim that pure profit maximization does not drive firm behavior. Three branches of literature are particularly worth mentioning here. First, direct tests of managers' objectives in the tradition of managerial economics have revealed that profit maximization alone does not guide managerial behavior. Two early examples of direct evidence on the sales maximization hypothesis are Hall (1967) and Lackman and Craycroft (1974) . Peck (1988) reports the results of a survey into corporate objectives among 1000 American and 1031 Japanese top managers. The findings were that increasing market share ranks third in the American and second in the Japanese sub-sample, whereas return on investment is first among American and third among Japanese top managers. Second, indirect evidence comes from studies of managerial behavior in the context of principal-agent theory. A large number of studies into managerial compensation in both IO and organization sciences literature (two 1990s examples being Jensen and Murphy, 1990, and Lambert et al., 1991) have revealed that executive bonuses and salaries are associated with both a firm's size and its level of profits, with the size correlations being the stronger of the two. The importance of sales growth as a motivation for management is also supported by evidence on the explanation of 'bad' acquisitions (Shleifer and Vishny, 1988; Morck et al., 1990) . Evidence from organization sciences contributions also clearly indicates that managers tend to prefer volume. Studies of firms' growth in particular point out that 'growth is frequently sought directly because it facilitates the internal management of an organization' (Whetten, 1987: 30) . Third, the literature on management fads and fashions reveals time and again that (top) managers are prone to herd behavior that lacks a direct link to profit-maximizing (or economic) rationality (Abrahamson, 1996 (Abrahamson, , 1997 . For instance, many studies have revealed that the recurrent merger waves are associated with much value destruction, that is, roughly two-thirds of all acquisitions and mergers produce ultimately (corrected for the overall market rise) stock values that are below the original sum of the partners involved (Copeland et al., 1993) .
Both inertia sources -production adjustment costs and managerial growth preferences -relate differently to OE. One the one hand, production adjustment costs are a source of organizational inertia that is closely related to OE's argument. In a way, production adjustment costs are a crude operationalization of OE's key argument that organizational change introduces a cost that may push an organization over the brink to failure. Inertia variations may be the result of organizational age and/or size differences (Hannan and Freeman, 1989) , or differences in capital intensity. The first model explicitly introduces the cost of change, while leaving the firm's utility (i.e. profit-maximizing) function intact. On the other hand, managerial growth preferences imply a lack of flexibility at the level of key actors -or the dominant coalition -within the organization that is not directly related to costs. On this source of inertia, OE is not very explicit. Hannan and Freeman's (1989: 67-8) reference to internal politics is particularly revealing, though: 'internal politics contribute to inertia. Altering structures upsets political equilibria. When resources controlled by an organization are fixed, structural change requires reallocating resources among subunits; so at least some subunits are likely to resist any proposed reorganization . . . Any negative political response will generate short-run political costs that may be high enough that decision makers will forgo the planned reorganization' (emphases added). However, the second model deviates from this line of reasoning by emphasizing the utility of growth (and the disutility of decline), without directly affecting the firm's cost function.
Our game-theoretic models explore the competitive implications of different inertia profiles. In this context, an interesting question is whether or not the competitive outcomes of rivalry are in line with OE's prediction. Together with the above variation in inertia sources, this produces the matrix of Table 1 with four cases.
As we illustrate below, the game theory tool is very helpful in deepening our understanding of the conditions that underlie the four different cases of Table 1 , producing theoretical evidence for established OE reasoning (Case 1), offering a new theoretical foundation to OE's argument (Case 2), revealing counterexamples to standard OE-logic (Case 3) or providing competitive scenarios outside OE's realm (Case 4).
Five inertia-related propositions
As was explained above, from an OE perspective the key argument is that relative inertia facilitates organizational survival. We will now formulate five propositions that may follow from this OE argument. The general nature of our propositions is specified to fit with this paper's models by operationalizing the key elements explicitly. First, standard OE logic predicts that inert firms tend to outperform their flexible counterparts, as is clear from the reproducibility and resetting-the-clock arguments. In terms of our production adjustment cost specification of organizational inertia, this is Proposition 1.
PROPOSITION 1 An organizationally flexible (i.e. without production adjustment cost) firm may well be outcompeted by an organizationally inert (i.e. with production adjustment cost) rival. In the extreme, the latter firm may even survive the former.
Proposition 1 is a specification of Hannan and Freeman's (1984) original inertia theory which directly introduces the impact of adjustment cost.
Second, the 'may'-formulation of Proposition 1 can be specified by exploring analytically the relevant contingencies. That is, under what environmental circumstances does an inert firm indeed outcompete its flexible counterpart? In this way the generalizability of OE reasoning can be explored analytically. As a start, this paper focuses on the influence of carrying capacity. Basically, a population's carrying capacity tends to be a control variable in empirical OE studies. After all, carrying capacity imposes a cap on the viable density of firms in a population, and declining carrying capacity intensifies competition. In this context, OE theory assumes that inertia outperforms flexibility irrespective of the population's carrying capacity. Proposition 2 emphasizes the validity of this OE logic in the circumstances of declining carrying capacity, but not in a booming market. IO's argument about direct competition in an oligopoly setting suggests why . In a declining market, an inert firm can increase its market share by not giving in to the environmental pressure to cut back on production volume, shifting the full burden of market decline to its flexible rival. Mirror image reasoning implies that the opposite outcome occurs in a booming market, as then the flexible firm can increase its market share by expanding its production volume. So an organizationally flexible firm will outperform its organizationally inert counterpart in a booming market. This gives Proposition 2.
PROPOSITION 2 An organizationally flexible (i.e. without production adjustment cost) firm will be outcompeted by an organizationally inert (i.e. with production adjustment cost) rival in a declining market. The opposite holds true in a booming market.
Proposition 2 is an example of a contingency theory of the performance effect of inertia, emphasizing the role of increasing vis-a-vis decreasing carrying capacity.
Third, OE's inertia theory suggests that day-to-day profit-maximizing behavior is counterproductive, since such a guiding principle is closely related to flexibility. With profit-maximizing behavior, after all, a firm immediately adapts its processes, structures and strategies as a function of emerging profit opportunities. This is the standard argument in the neo-classical IO theory of the firm (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1989) . Everything that a firm does is meant to adapt to changing circumstances in order to maximize profitability. Agency theory fits into this tradition, too. At the end of the day, agency modeling retains the ultimate objective of the firm of profit maximization, albeit taking into account such complexities as information costs, incentive structures and nonprofit-maximizing employees. In this paper, the standard IO argument is that a firm will move its production volume up and down with increasing and decreasing aggregated market demand so as to maximize its profitability. 4 Holmstrom and Tirole (1989: 103) argue that 'incentives should not be connected with quantity choice and the profit maximization paradigm remains valid in spite of agency problems'. In OE reasoning, this implies the type of flexibility that reduces the firm's reliability and reproducibility, and so survival chances. In the retrenchment context of this paper, the argument may be that work-floor motivation and operational routines break down after a downsizing reorganization (Pfeffer, 1998; Kets de Vries and Balazs, 1997) . Basically, OE argues that selection may operate on many other dimensions than pure profitability alone. In this context, Hannan and Freeman (1989: 20) even set aside optimization reasoning altogether as a viable route for explaining selection processes. In this paper the OE argument implies that nonprofit-maximizing behavior as a result of managerial resistance against downsizing may help the firm in its battle for selective survival. This argument produces Proposition 3.
PROPOSITION 3 A managerially flexible (i.e. profit-maximizing) firm may well be outcompeted by a managerially inert (i.e. nonprofit-maximizing) rival. In the extreme, the latter firm may even survive the former.
Proposition 3 is a clear example of an OE-related argument that goes against any traditional IO or strategic choice intuition, by adding another twist to OE's logic emphasizing managerial rather than organizational inertia (see Proposition 1). This counterintuitive line of reasoning can be extrapolated further by introducing the role of efficiency.
As has been indicated above, a popular argument in much organization sciences literature is that efficiency facilitates a firm's profitability and, thus, survival chances. In effect, this argument has dominated economics for at least 120 years through the heavy emphasis on the analysis of pure or perfect competition in general equilibrium analyses (Novshek and Sonnenschein, 1987) . The relevant current seminal works of IO are the theories of perfect contestability (Baumol et al., 1982) and industry structure (Panzar, 1989) , which prove mathematically why and how cost efficiencies determine entry and exit processes as well as industry structure equilibria. These theories are consistent with the assumption of the standard economic theory which postulates that, given natural selection, profit-maximizing and thus efficient firms will survive and, hence, dominate in reality (Alchian, 1950; Friedman, 1953; Machlup, 1967) , as is now a standard result in IO's theory of market evolution (Jovanovic, 2001) . 5 Again, applying OE reasoning may produce a different prediction. That is, if the drive for efficiency introduces the need for changing processes, structures and strategies, the ultimate downside of reduced inertia may dominate the
immediate benefit of cost decreases. 6 Hannan and Freeman (1989: 34) refer to the necessity of correcting the 'overemphasis of the role of efficiency considerations' in organization sciences. In effect, they (1989: 339) argue that '[a]lthough we recognize that considerations of efficiency have powerful consequences for many kinds of organizations, we feel that they do not obviously override institutional and political considerations'. Proposition 4 relates to this argument.
PROPOSITION 4 A cost-efficient (i.e. low-cost) and managerially flexible (i.e. profit-maximizing) firm may well be outcompeted by a cost-inefficient (i.e. high-cost) and managerially inert (i.e. nonprofitmaximizing) rival. In the extreme, the latter firm may even survive at the expense of the former.
Thus Proposition 4 introduces the inefficiency-may-survive argument on top of Proposition 3's prediction of the viability of nonprofit-maximizing (managerially inert) behavior.
Propositions 1-4 really oppose OE reasoning with traditional strategic choice and IO predictions. However, there is a literature that emphasizes that this apparent 'either-or' story is really a matter of 'both-and'. That is, it may well be that a firm must seek both flexibility and inertia, rather than either of the two. An example of this argument is Burgelman (1991) , who points out that an organization should combine an inert core with a flexible periphery, as this combination permits the firm to be reliable without losing its ability to adapt. Alternatively, if perfect flexibility and complete inertia are considered to be the extremes at the opposite sides of a continuum, a trade-off calculation may point the way to striking the happy medium. This type of reasoning suggests that there is an optimal degree of what we may call, perhaps not so elegantly, 'flexertia'. From a contingency perspective, we assume here that this optimal degree of flexertia depends upon environmental circumstances. For example, flexibility may dominate in young and high-tech industries, whereas inertia may be crucial in old and low-tech markets. Proposition 5 stands on this middle ground.
PROPOSITION 5 Depending upon a number of environmental contingencies (i.e. carrying capacity, cost level and the rival's decision rule), an optimal (i.e. 'profit-maximizing') degree of flexertia can be calculated.
Proposition 5 describes what we may call the profit-maximization paradox. In terms of the production adjustment cost model, this implies that ultimate profit maximization may result when the firm does not minimize costs, but rather introduces production adjustment costs that commit the firm to its current production volume. From the managerial growth preference model, to maximize its ultimate profitability it may be that a firm should behave as if dayto-day decision-making is guided by nonprofit-maximizing rules. The interpretation of this paradox will be discussed below, from both OE and IO perspectives. Together, Propositions 1-5 are clear examples of the counterintuitive predictions that may follow from OE-related reasoning. This paper provides a theoretical underpinning of such OE-related hypotheses by developing a mathematical game theory in which production adjustment cost, (non)profit maximization, (in)efficiency and/or selection are introduced so as to provide support for all five propositions in a competitive Cournot duopoly IO setting. It is to these models that we now turn.
Two game-theoretic models
Overall model structure Both models introduce direct strategic competition in the form of a Cournot duopoly: two incumbent firms compete over output by deciding on the supply volume they offer to the demand side of the market. The key issue in Proposition 3 is that nonprofit-maximizing behavior may facilitate survival. Therefore, the model builds on a specific (and small) class of game-theoretic models which all explore the consequences of nonprofit-maximizing firm behavior in a competitive setting. Particularly interesting game-theoretic models in this tradition have been presented by Vickers (1985) , Fershtman and Judd (1987) , Sklivas (1987) , Basu (1995) and van Witteloostuijn (1998) . 7 In all these papers firms are assumed to have sales (growth) as well as profit objectives, which introduces an element of organizational size, departing from the extreme profit-maximization rationality postulate commonly imposed in orthodox game-theoretic contributions. Our model here starts from this framework of socalled within-firm delegation (Vickers, 1985) , by incorporating the assumption that firms maximize a combination of profits and sales growth. In a period t a firm maximizes a utility (u t ) function that comprises two elements: profit (w t ) and sales growth (s t -s t-1 ). Thus,
where ␣ is a parameter that indicates the relative importance of the sales growth component. 8 Here we apply Hannan and Freeman's (1989) resistance-againstreorganization argument to managers facing a downsizing option. In the model, the parameter ␣ reflects an aspect of Hannan and Freeman's (1984) 'political costs' in the case of retrenchment. Managerial inertia plays a key role in the model by the essential driver ␣, which represents the management's preference for high sales growth. With ␣ Ͼ 0 this is clear from Equation (1): if the firm faces decline (s t -s t-1 Ͻ 0), then ␣(s t -s t-1 ) contributes negatively to utility, whereas the opposite occurs in times of growth [as then s t -s t-1 Ͼ 0, implying that ␣(s t -s t-1 ) Ͼ 0]. 9 For the sake of simplicity, the analysis is restricted to duopoly competition. 10 Two firms compete over quantities (Cournot duopoly). Hence, firms decide on output only. Note that s = 0 indicates exit. The inverse demand function is
which reflects a standard downward-sloping function with p denoting price, d being a demand size parameter and S reflecting market supply (that is, the sum of the output volumes of firm 1, s 1 , and firm 2, s 2 ). Equation (2) 
which includes the cases with constant (c 2 = 0), increasing (c 2 Ͼ 0) and decreasing (c 2 Ͻ 0) marginal cost. Additionally, production adjustment cost a in period t follows from
(s t-1 -s t ) if s t < s t-1 and a t = ␤ 2 (s t -s t-1 ) if s t > s t-1 (4)
where ␤ 1 is the adjustment cost of a production reduction of size (s t-1 -s t ) Ͼ 0, and ␤ 2 denotes the adjustment cost of a production expansion of size (s t-1 -s t ) Ͻ 0. 11 The ␤-parameter is a catch-all specification of Hannan and Freeman's (1984) cost-of-change argument for the case of organizational size. With ␤ 1 = ␤ 2 , the costs of downsizing and upsizing are symmetric. If ␤ 1 Ͼ ␤ 2 = 0, the implication of production adjustment cost function (4) resembles the asymmetric downsizing disutility effect of utility function (1) with ␣ Ͼ 0. Substitution of the inverse demand (2), average cost (3) and adjustment cost (4) functions into decision rule (1) 
where i,j = 1,2 and i ≠ j, and with the Cournot-Nash expectation that the rival will sustain the last period's output volume. Note that firm i's sales volume increases with carrying capacity (d) and firm i's downward inertia (␣ i ), and falls with the estimated sales volume of firm j (s j ) and firm i's average cost (c i 1 and c i 2 ). This completes the model. Standard calculation of the Cournot-Nash solution gives the equilibrium values of output and profit for both firms. The CournotNash equilibrium tool helps to calculate the firms' best-reply output decisions from which neither of the rivals is willing to depart, given the strategy of the opponent. The outcome is contingent upon the values of the parameters d, ␣ i , ␣ j , c i 1 , c i 2 , c j 1 , c j 2 , ␤ i 1 , ␤ i 2 , ␤ j 1 and ␤ j 2 . Varying the values of this set of parameters generates a large number of equilibria.
How relative inertia works out in the model can be illustrated with IO's reaction curve apparatus. A Cournot reaction curve of firm i reproduces all utility-maximizing quantity (s i ) responses (i.e. best replies) of firm i to all quantity strategies of rival j (s j ). Figure 1 provides typical reaction curves (R) for the standard Cournot duopoly model (Panel 1A), the model with production adjustment costs only (Panel 1B) and the model with managerial growth preferences only (Panel 1C) . Note that in the last two cases we assume, for the sake of the argument, that an inert firm i faces a flexible rival j.
For now, we concentrate on the reaction curves R i a and R j a . First, Panel 1A describes the standard textbook Cournot duopoly case. Both rivals' reaction curves R i a and R j a are linear and downward-sloping. In the symmetric case (i.e. with firm homogeneity), both firms split the market equally, implying that both rivals' equilibrium volumes are equal (s i a ,E = s j a ,E ), in period a's equilibrium E a . Second, Panel 1B reflects the case where rival i, facing a flexible rival j (␤ j 1 = ␤ j 2 = 0), is confronted with symmetric production adjustment costs
in the absence of nonprofit-maximizing motives (␣ i = ␣ j = 0). What this does is introduce a symmetrically flat part in rival i's reaction curve
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Panel 1A: Standard Cournot duopoly (5) can be interpreted as a supergame in which Cournot-Nash rivalry is played time and again (this is the reason for putting the t-subscript in place). A high ␣, ␤ 1 or ␤ 2 represents a time-consistent change barrier, where a high-␣ or high-␤ firm does not respond or just slowly responds to, say, decreasing demand (that is, falling carrying capacity through a decline in parameter d: see Equation (2)). Second, the ␣-parameter is inextricably bound up with the size issue, an organizational feature which is central to much OE work. On this, Hannan and Freeman (1984: 158) assume that '[t]he level of structural inertia increases with size for each class of organization'. This assumption is nicely reflected in the consequences of a high ␣. After all, a high ␣ is closely associated with large size and downward inertia. Below we will briefly highlight a limited number of key results relevant to this paper. Detailed accounts of the model with production adjustment costs only (␣ i = ␣ j = 0), including all proofs and results, are presented in van Lier and van Witteloostuijn (2002) . Detailed proofs and results for the model with managerial growth preferences only (␤ i 1 = ␤ i 2 = ␤ j 1 = ␤ j 2 = 0) are reported in van Lier and van Witteloostuijn (1993) and, for Propositions 3 and 4, in van Witteloostuijn (1998) .
Proposition 1
Proposition 1 refers to the potentially beneficial effect of positive production adjustment costs. To focus on this issue, we set ␣ i and ␣ j at zero. Proposition 1 can be illustrated by considering the case of a declining market, that is, shrinking carrying capacity. Much strategic management common sense suggests that in such environmental circumstances an organization must, for the sake of profitability and survival, adapt to decreasing demand by flexibly reducing its production volume. Table 2 reproduces the results of two simulation experiments: the first relates to standard Cournot duopoly rivalry without any production adjustment costs (␤ i 1 = ␤ i 2 = ␤ j 1 = ␤ j 2 = 0), and the second involves the hybrid case where firm i is inert (␤ i 1 = ␤ i 2 = 0.3) and firm j is not (␤ j 1 = ␤ j 2 = 0). 12 For the sake of simplicity, we assume constant returns to scale and average cost homogeneity (c i 1 = c j 1 = 0.4 and c i 2 = c j 2 = 0). The simulation involves the stepwise reduction of demand in the form of a declining demand parameter d (from d = 1.00 to d = 0.60). In terms of Equation (2) this implies that the demand curve shifts toward the origin, without any change in the curve's slope (i.e. with constant elasticity). 
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The standard Cournot duopoly outcomes reflect textbook knowledge. Both symmetric firms share the burden of declining demand equally by flexibly reducing their production volumes step by step from 0.200 to 0.067, implying equal profitability, in accordance with each further reduction of the demand parameter d from 1.00 to 0.60. Interestingly, if firm i features production adjustment costs (␤ i 1 = ␤ i 2 = 0.3), inertia clearly outperforms flexibility as the flexible firm j's profit is far below inert firm i's (for d is reduced from 0.95 to 0.70). Ultimately, when the demand parameter d has declined to 0.60, the flexible firm j decides to exit from the market altogether.
This counterintuitive result can be explained with reference to Figure 2 's shifting reaction curves.
In Panel 2A, the standard symmetric Cournot duopoly case, declining demand from period t to t+1 induces a symmetric inward shift of both firms' reaction curves to, e.g. R i t+1 and R j t+1 . So, the equilibrium production volumes drop as a Siamese twin from s i
,E . This is radically different if firm i features inertia as a result of positive production adjustment costs. Then, as is clear from the R t+1 -curves in Panel 2B, the inward shift of both rivals' reaction curves does not affect the inert rival i's equilibrium production volume (s i t ,E = s i t+1 ,E ) because the flexible firm j's reaction curve still crosses the inert firm's best-reply function through the flat part, implying that the flexible rival j takes all the burden of environmental decline by reducing its output from s j t ,E to s j t+1 ,E . The intuition is that firm i is inert to avoid the profit-reducing effect of downsizing that results from, for instance, the high cost of sacking high-commitment employees.
Proposition 2
Proposition 2 builds on the above by introducing a key contingency: decreasing or increasing carrying capacity. Table 2 illustrates what happens when the market declines. Table 3 is Table 2 's mirror image because it reveals the outcomes of Figure 3 Production adjustment cost in a booming market
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two similar simulations (keeping all parameters equal, apart from d) with booming demand. Now the population's carrying capacity moves upward as a consequence of the stepwise increase of demand parameter d (from 1.00 to 1.50). That is, the demand curve moves away from the origin, without any change in the curve's slope (i.e. with constant elasticity). The standard symmetric Cournot duopoly simulation again reproduces common textbook knowledge. Both firms follow market demand symmetrically by moving the Cournot equilibrium output volumes upward, which comes with increasing profitability. The simulation where firm i features production adjustment costs (␤ i 1 = ␤ i 2 = 0.3), however, is radically different. Flexibility clearly outperforms inertia as the flexible firm j's profit is far above inert firm i's (for d moves from 1.35 to 1.50). Although the underperforming firm i does not decide to exit, its growth is so much smaller than firm j's that it ends up with a sales volume that is only 44% of its rival's. Figure 3 's reaction curve apparatus clarifies what is going on here.
With booming demand, both reaction curves move to the northeast rather than the southwest, as with declining demand. In Panel 3A's standard symmetric Cournot duopoly case, this would result in the non-dotted reaction curves R i t+1 and R j t+1 . Hence, the demand increase from period t to t+1 triggers a symmetric outward shift of both firms' reaction curves, implying that both rivals benefit equally from the boom as equilibrium output volumes expand from s i
,E . (which is Panel 2A's mirror image). If firm i faces upward production adjustment costs, though, it is forced to delay any output expansion, implying that its flexible rival j can benefit fully from increased demand. In Panel 2B this is reflected in the reaction curves R i t+1 and R j t+1 . The flexible firm j's best-reply function R j t+1 still crosses the inert rival's i reaction curve R i t+1 in the flat part, so that the latter does not take part in the outputincreasing game in a booming market. The flexible firm j increases its equilibrium output from s j t ,E to s j t+1 ,E , whereas the inert rival i's equilibrium volume does not change (s i t ,E to s i t+1 ,E ). The inert firm faces an expansion barrier that limits its ability to react to the opportunities that a booming market offers. The second model introduces managerial inertia, assuming zero production adjustment cost: (␤ i 1 = ␤ i 2 = ␤ j 1 = ␤ j 2 = 0) and demand stability (d is fixed). 13 Consider first Proposition 3 by focusing on the case of cost homogeneity (c i 1 = c j 1 = c, implying that both firms are equally efficient, and c i 2 = c j 2 = 0, assuming constant returns to scale) and favorable market demand (that is, c Ͻ d). The latter condition implies that in the standard Cournot duopoly equilibrium (␣ i = ␣ j = 0) both firms operate profitably. The following two classes of equilibrium outcomes (A and B) are particularly interesting.
A If both firms are characterized by substantial managerial inertia, damaging competition occurs that drives profits toward or below zero, depending on the force of inertia. Although demand conditions reflect profit opportunities, price eventually falls below the level of average cost as a result of excessive market supply. Firm i is larger than firm j if ␣ i Ͼ ␣ j , and vice versa. Note that in the region where profit is positive for both firms (that is, if
, the more inert firm is also the more profitable one. The reason for this is that the relatively inert firm has higher sales than its relatively profitmaximizing rival, and both face an identical price-cost margin. B If firm j is characterized by excessive managerial inertia compared with its rival (␣ j ϾϾ ␣ i ), the relatively flexible firm i is expelled from the market and the inert firm j survives. The reason is that firm i no longer perceives a viable niche due to the expansion of firm j: the inert firm j has expanded output beyond the profitable threshold (i.e. such that price, p, is below cost, c). Although market demand would enable two firms to produce profitably, even the surviving monopolist captures negative returns. Figure 4 offers an interpretation of the competitive outcomes in terms of reaction curves. As a result of a higher ␣, the firm's reaction curve shifts outward. Starting from the standard Cournot duopoly case of R 0 i and R 0 j , an increase from ␣ 0 i = 0 to ␣ 1 i Ͼ 0 produces an example of equilibrium class A, where the flexible rival j is still in the market, albeit with a much lower output volume than its inert rival i (
shifts the inert firm i's reaction curve beyond the flexible rival j's exit threshold (at s M i , where s M j = 0), so entering into equilibrium area B. So both classes of equilibrium outcomes suggest that managerial inertia induces endogenous cut-throat competition, even in munificent environments. That is, environmental decline does not seem to be a necessary condition for cut-throat competition, as is frequently assumed. In fact, the equilibrium outcomes of the game only change quantitatively, and not qualitatively, in the case of environmental decline. More specifically, the incidence of exit, as described in equilibrium class B, goes up if demand decreases (d down, and, for that matter, if cost increases, c up). Thus, the likelihood that a profit-maximizing firm will be expelled from the market
by a managerially inert firm increases if demand decreases. When both firms prefer growth, both will stand the test of environmental decline, although the market is nonviable in terms of profitability (that is, c Ͼ d). In that case, purely economic motives for operation are overruled by the force of managerial inertia.
Proposition 4
Proposition 4 goes against the efficiency-favors-survival argument. The next step is therefore to introduce cost heterogeneity. In the model the efficiency argument is introduced by assuming that cost is heterogeneous (that is, c i ≠ c j ). Standard economic intuition predicts that the low-cost (efficient) firm will grow and/or survive. However, a re-analysis of the model with efficiency differences reveals that this is not necessarily the case. The following two classes of equilibrium outcomes (C-D) are particularly illustrative.
C Given favorable demand (d Ͼ c), cost heterogeneity (c i Ͼ c j ) associated with asymmetric managerial inertia (␣ i Ͼ ␣ j ) results in a profit-making duopoly with an inefficient market leader, firm i, and an efficient follower, firm j.
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Figure 4
Managerial growth preferences D If an inefficient firm i is characterized by substantial managerial inertia compared to its rival (␣ i ϾϾ ␣ j ), the inefficient firm i drives out the efficient firm j. The result is an inefficient, managerially-inert, loss-making monopoly. The latter outcome is robust to changes in the demand regime (from favorable, d Ͼ c, to unfavorable, d Ͻ c).
The key finding here is that a relatively inert firm may outcompete a relatively flexible rival -either by growing into the market leader or by expanding into a monopolist -even if the former faces a cost disadvantage (Ghemawat and Nalebuff, 1985, 1990) . Again, introducing strategic competition alone -that is, in a munificent demand environment -is sufficient to generate this result. Overall, the equilibrium classes A-D communicate the message that a profitmaximizing firm may be at a disadvantage if a rival blindly pursues a salesgrowth maximizing strategy, even if the former is more efficient.
Proposition 5
A final issue, Proposition 5, is that the model permits us to calculate the optimal level of flexertia (van Lier and van Witteloostuijn, 1993) . In the first model, firm i can maximize relative profitability by setting its production adjustment cost parameters ␤ i 1 and ␤ i 2 at levels that maximize w i -w j , given firm j's ␤ j 1 and ␤ j 2 . Put differently, firm i may set its ␤-parameters to maximize G = w i /w j . Taking shifting demand (d) into account produces a complicated calculus exercise, as different relative profitabilities result at different levels of demand parameter d. In van Lier and van Witteloostuijn (2002) , this is illustrated by substituting a sinus function of d into equation (5), setting ␣ i and ␣ j at zero, which introduces a full-swing business cycle into the production adjustment cost model. Here, we focus on six illustrative values of G for the bust phase of the business cycle only (i.e. with declining values of d), as reported in Table 4 . In so doing, we analyze Proposition 5's flexertia argument for Proposition 2's case of a declining market. Table 4 reports the G-maximizing values of ␤ i 1 (denoted as ␤ * ) for different sets of values for ␤ j 1 and ␥ (note that in a declining market ␤ i 2 and ␤ j 2 are not relevant), where a higher ␥ produces a larger business cycle amplitude. Table 4 's outcomes are indeed revealing, with G ranging from 1.07 to 1.81. For example, if ␤ j 1 = 0.05 and ␥ = 0.30, the inert firm i's profit is almost twice as large as its flexible rival j's. In all six cases, firm i does maximize its relative profitability by featuring more organizational inertia than its rival j (␤ i 1 Ͼ ␤ j 1 ). So cost minimization goes against profit maximization, which is our first example of the profit-maximization paradox.
Our second example relates to the managerial growth preference model. Given the sales motivation of rival j (reflected in ␣ j ), firm i can compute the level of managerial inertia (implied by ␣ i ) that maximizes absolute profit or minimizes absolute losses (and vice versa). Figure 5 nicely illustrates this point.
First, take curve I. At point C firm i captures maximum profits (or minimum losses in the case of curves II and III), w i , with the inertia-determining parameter ␣ i being fixed at (d -c -␣ j )/4. The result is a profit if c Ͻ d (that is, if the environment is favorable) and ␣ j Ͻ d -c (that is, if the rival does not drive strategic competition to the cut-throat limit). Hence, for a specific range of Figure 5 firm i does not face a profit-growth trade-off, provided that demand is favorable (c Ͻ d) and
Figure 5 Profit-maximizing managerial inertia rival j is relatively flexible (␣ j Ͻ d -c). 14 That is, in specific circumstances firm i can increase the rate of profit and growth. Of course, the nature of the profit-growth linkage of firm i hinges upon the strategy of rival j. With decreasing demand (or increasing cost, for that matter) and/or reduced flexibility of firm j, the curve I in Figure 5 shifts to the southwest (see the curves II and III). Note, however, that for a reasonable range of parameter values (c Ͻ d and ␣ j Ͻ d -c) a profit-maximizing level of managerial inertia can indeed be calculated.
The interpretation of the endogeneity or exogeneity of ␣ and ␤ is paradigm-dependent. From an OE perspective, ␣ and ␤ may be the result of imprinted routines, rules and procedures reflected in an organizational culture that urges management to seek growth (high ␣) or to offer high-commitment contracts (␤). In the high-␣ case, this may even be done at the expense of profitability, so as to avoid political costs (or vice versa). The observation that an organizational culture is difficult to change, particularly if the firm faces downsizing, is well established in the literature (Hofstede, 1991) . Then, population dynamics will take care of the selection of firms with fitting ␣'s or ␤'s. So, the profit-maximization paradox is solved by Darwinian market selection, without the flexible or inert firms being able to adapt their imprinted ␣'s or ␤'s to environmental contingencies. In the managerial growth preference model, selection operates on the ␣-dimension (the degree of flexertia) rather than the c-dimension (relative efficiency). From a strategic choice and industrial organization angle, the adaptation argument would be emphasized. That is, ␣ or ␤ may be manipulated purposely by, for example, designing an optimal organizational structure, management compensation scheme or human resource management policy. In an ␣-setting game, this is the way agency theory treats issues of managerial behavior. For example, Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987) examine the strategic advantage that can be derived from various compensation schemes. Basically, they show that owners can increase the profit of their firm in a Cournot setting, ceteris paribus, by paying the managers on the basis of obtained (absolute) profit and sales. That is, managers are paid I = P + (1 -)S, where I denotes the manager's income, P profit, S sales and 0 Ͻ Ͻ 1. As in our managerial growth preference model, the result is that firms behave more aggressively in the Cournot output game. So the profit-maximization paradox is now solved by transferring the assumption of profit-maximizing (and thus, in the current context, flexibility) behavior to the owners, rather than the managers, where profit-maximizing owners may install incentives today that impose nonprofit-maximizing behavior (and thus inertia) upon their managers tomorrow. In a similar vein, a firm's managers and owners may decide to introduce high-commitment human resource management practices as a competitive commitment-increasing strategy to increase the downward production adjustment cost to a level that maximizes the profitability lead over their rival. That is, profit is maximized by not minimizing cost in a ␤-setting game.
The underlying rationale relates to the commitment to refrain from downsizing in a declining market.
Appraisal
The aim of this paper has been to demonstrate that considerable progress can be made with our understanding of the relationships between relative inertia, market competition and organizational performance by integrating the conceptual richness of OE with the analytical rigor of IO's game-theoretic modeling. The main outcomes of the models presented above can be summarized as follows. First, organizational inertia in the form of production adjustment cost may well benefit an inert firm vis-a-vis a flexible rival (Proposition 1). Second, the beneficial effect of production adjustment inertia only materializes in a declining market, and reverses in a booming one (Proposition 2). Third, managerial inertia through nonprofit-maximizing behavior may facilitate organizational survival, which is in support of the key argument of OE that relative inertia is a consequence of selection (Proposition 3). Fourth, an inefficient and inert (i.e. nonprofit-maximizing) firm may survive, notwithstanding the accumulation of losses, to the detriment of a relatively flexible (i.e. profit-motivated) and efficient (i.e. low-cost) rival (Proposition 4). Fifth, knowing the production adjustment cost or sales motivation of the rival i, the (relative or absolute) profit-maximizing level of organizational or managerial inertia for firm j can be calculated (Proposition 5). Together, in relation to Table 1 , this set of five results provides insights that offer theoretical support for: 1 standard OE reasoning (Case 1 and Proposition 1); 2 an alternative explanation for OE's anti-flexibility argument (Case 2, and Propositions 3 and 4); and 3 a contingency enrichment of the flexibility vis-a-vis inertia debate (Case 3 and Proposition 2). 15
The second and fifth findings are particularly interesting as these results are halfway between both extreme positions in the flexibility-inertia debate by suggesting that neither being inert (OE) nor being flexible (strategic choice theory) per se is the universal remedy against organizational failure. That is, knowing the environmental conditions (i.e. carrying capacity development) and the rivals' characteristics (i.e. production adjustment cost or managerial growth preference), a fitting level of inertia (or flexibility, for that matter) can be determined. This conclusion is nicely reflected in Hambrick and D'Aveni's (1988) study into organizational failure: neither strategic passivity (too much inertia) nor strategic hyperactivity (too much flexibility) enhances survival chances. The bottom line is that '[p]ure profit maximizing behavior may be at the expense of organizational survival ' (D'Aveni, 1989b: 135) . In our models this is because pure costminimizing or profit-maximizing firms are the likely victims of strategic competition, and in D' Aveni's (1989b) argument this follows from the status capital that is associated with prestigious but expensive managers. This observation illustrates that the performance effect and choice nature of flexibility, inertia or flexertia critically depends upon the underlying inertia-producing sources and competition-ruling contingencies. For instance, D'Aveni's prestige inertia source is much more difficult to manipulate purposefully than our production adjustment cost, and flexibility enhances profit in a booming market but depresses it in a declining one. There is much further research needed in order to fully understand the complicated and subtle mechanisms at work here, for different inertia sources and different competitive contingencies.
As far as cut-throat competition is concerned, two important considerations are suggested by the models. First, the universal argument that firms should be flexible in the face of turbulent environments is indeed precarious. This is very explicit in the production adjustment cost model, where flexibility is clearly outperformed by inertia in a declining market. Additionally, the managerial growth preference model reveals that managerial inertia may facilitate survival. It is important to stress, however, that in the present managerial growth preference game highly inert firms survive at the detriment of profit-maximizing firms not without a cost: that is, the former are prepared to sacrifice profits, even to the extent of a long-run loss, for the sake of survival and large size. This outcome is not that surprising, as revealing examples can be found of surviving companies that accumulate (or have accumulated) losses for several years in a row (examples being General Motors in the US and Hoogovens in the Netherlands). For an account of permanently failing organizations we refer to the insightful work of Meyer and Zucker (1989) . Interestingly, they argue that the reason for permanent failure is that '[m]ost people are more concerned with maintaining existing organizations than with maximizing organizational performance ' (1989: 23) .
A number of additional real-world examples seem to reveal patterns that resemble the theoretical predictions of our models. Specifically, our theoretical arguments can be illustrated on the basis of the findings of Baden-Fuller (1989) in the UK steel castings market, of Sutton (1991) in food industries and of van Witteloostuijn (1998) in the (petro)chemical industry. The studies of BadenFuller (1989) and van Witteloostuijn (1998) reveal that exits by no means originate from the low-profitability (Baden-Fuller) or low-efficiency (van Witteloostuijn) part of the market. A substantial number of unprofitable (steel castings) and inefficient (petrochemicals) operations stayed in the market while profitable and efficient opponents decided to close down. Additionally, data on the largest chemical companies in the world reveal that substantial differences prevail in the firms' use of downsizing strategies (van Witteloostuijn, 1998) . Firms vary considerably in their downward adjustment of sales in times of a recession: a number of firms decreased sales in years of industry decline, whereas others even raised their sales volume in the same periods. Finally, Sutton (1991) , on the basis of a study in such industries as brewing, frozen food, and salt and sugar, reports that firms that started to escalate (sunk) advertising expenditures have grown into the current market leaders. 16 The observation from the managerial growth preference model that some firms sacrifice profits and even accumulate losses in order to survive complicates the present debate on the appropriateness of different outcome measures to evaluate the success of individual companies. Two main outcome measures can be distinguished: efficiency (with its associated measures of financial performance) and mere survival. IO and strategic choice theory (for example, strategic group analysis) are (in many cases implicitly) inclined to equate both outcome measures. More specifically, the argument is that efficient and thus profitable firms will survive in the long run. As long as both measures are positively related, the debate on the appropriateness of different outcome measures is limited to its measurement properties. In that case, we agree that survival is preferable to efficiency because '[n]othing but the absolute test of survival is significant objectively' (Barnard, 1947: 70; Carroll and Swaminathan, 1992) . However, more fundamental questions, which have important ramifications for OE's selection theory, are raised if efficiency and survival are not necessarily -or sometimes even negatively -related. To be sure, OE recognizes that selection may operate on many dimensions such as efficiency and inertia (or flexibility), and that the target of evolution may change over time (Hannan and Freeman, 1989) . However, almost nothing is known about these issues. Questions such as 'on which dimensions does selection operate?', 'in which circumstances does the target of evolution change?' and 'when does selection favor efficiency, inertia or both?' remain unanswered. It is clear that every selection theory, be it in the field of economics, management or sociology, should give priority to answering these questions.
In our view, game-theoretic modeling may contribute to our understanding of these issues by specifying the characteristics of surviving firms in equilibrium. Of course, for this purpose more complex models are needed than the ones presented above. For example, a key limitation of the managerial growth preference model is that the firm's profit constraint (or, to be precise, loss constraint) is infinite. It is more realistic to assume that institutional restrictions limit the possibility to accumulate losses endlessly in order to remain big. For instance, following empirical studies on organizational decline (D'Aveni, 1989b (D'Aveni, , 1989c , the influence of such restrictions can be introduced by modeling creditors' confidence. Additionally, we have restricted our discussion to the duopoly case. From our n-firm model in van Lier and van Witteloostuijn (1993) , we may expect that n-firm equilibria may well feature considerable firm heterogeneity, implying that firms with different flexibility or inertia profiles survive in one and the same market (Mezias and Lant, 1994) . Moreover, the model can be extended in a number of other ways. A priority here is to study other forms and sources of inertia, such as the escalation of advertising outlays or R&D expenses. Then, demand (or carrying capacity, d in our model) is endogenized rather than fixed. In this respect, Sutton (1991 Sutton ( , 1998 
convincingly shows that modeling
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advertising and R&D outlays as an endogenous sunk cost leads to important insights into the evolution of industry structure. It is very likely that such model extensions will reveal other interesting equilibria not covered by the present models, such as inefficient and inert firms surviving to the detriment of efficient firms without incurring losses.
A second implication is that two forms of cut-throat competition should be distinguished: exogenous versus endogenous competition. Exogenous competition is caused by environmental dynamism (or, for that matter, relative shifts in the carrying capacity of populations), examples being a decline in demand as a result of shifting customer tastes or an increase in the density of a population following increased entry. Exogenous competition is therefore tantamount to increases in diffuse competition. Endogenous competition is the result of increases in direct rivalry among firms within a population in the form of strategic moves. The IO literature suggests that these strategic moves, in turn, should induce organizational or managerial inertia (Dixit, 1982; Ghemawat, 1991) . More specifically, path dependence not only exists at the system level (Carroll and Harrison, 1993 ) but also at the organizational and managerial level, as prior decisions or strategic moves affect current and future decisions or moves. Thus, strategic moves, relative inertia and path dependencies are intricately related. It is argued that these processes may have a profound impact on the extent of competition and therefore, eventually, on the structure of an entire industry or population. A first case in point is the important outcome of our models that a flexible firm may well be expelled from the market altogether by a managerially or organizationally inert rival. The point is that if one firm develops a habit with respect to sustaining or building market share or production volume, the flexible firm (particularly in declining markets) has no choice but to follow the leader, providing it wants to survive. So, the inert firm induces cutthroat competition and erodes the profits of both firms. Another case is the escalation of competition in advertising or R&D-intensive industries, as described by Sutton (1991 Sutton ( , 1998 . Game-theoretic modeling with endogenous sunk (advertising or R&D) costs allowed Sutton (1991 Sutton ( , 1998 to formulate robust predictions of the evolution of the structure of advertising or R&D-intensive industries. More specifically, the competitive escalation of advertising or R&D outlays in such industries inevitably leads to the survival of only a limited number of heavy advertising or R&D-investing leading firms. Note that the escalation of advertising or R&D outlays is a specific form of path dependence or inertia.
Finally, in our view more effort is needed to integrate theories of diffuse (or exogenous) and direct (or endogenous) competition. Until now, OE has focused on diffuse competition and relative shifts in the carrying capacity of populations as the main trigger of organizational selection. We suggest that endogenous processes, shaped by relative inertia and path dependencies at the organizational or managerial level, may be as salient as exogenous processes in shaping the evolution of industries or populations. In effect, inertia-inducing processes, struc-tures and/or strategies may well be an important determinant of the intensity of competitive rivalry. In any case, a theory of competition should incorporate both diffuse and direct processes (Hannan and Carroll, 1992; Singh, 1993) . We are convinced that considerable progress can be made on this issue by crossfertilizing IO's insights on direct competition with OE's notions of diffuse competition. We strongly believe that game-theoretic methodology is the natural candidate to achieve this. Of course, this paper is a theoretical one, but we believe that game-theoretic work will produce many interesting insights that can be put to the test in empirical studies. The two models presented here, for instance, produce five propositions that can be translated into testable hypotheses of the relationships between production adjustment costs, management compensation schemes, carrying capacity development, efficiency per unit, firm profitability and organizational longevity.
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1 The following argument overemphasizes the contrast between IO and OE by purposely ignoring the grey zone between IO's black and OE's white. A clear example of a grey-zone theory is Carroll's (1985) resource-partitioning framework. Boone and van Witteloostuijn (1995) offer a detailed review of this promising grey zone. An attempt to tie together the different theory fragments of IO and OE in a unifying framework is van Witteloostuijn et al. (1999) . 2 It should be mentioned, however, that empirical OE research consistently shows that mortality rates are higher for smaller and younger as opposed to larger and older organizations [liability of smallness and liability of newness, respectively; see Singh and Lumsden, 1990 , for an early review]. As it is generally accepted that inertia increases with organizational size and age (Kelly and Amburgey, 1991) , these findings offer at least indirect evidence for the selection-favors-inertia argument. However, other explanations can account for these findings as well, such as market power and organizational slack (Haveman, 1993) . Note, moreover, that the age-size-mortality linkage may be a statistical artefact (Barron et al., 1994) . 3 Of course, many contributions to the strategic management literature, particularly those concerned with the processes of strategic decision making, emphasize the viscidity of organizational manoeuvring, a well-known example being Quinn's (1978) logical incrementalism. However, the very purpose of strategic management is to adapt to environmental circumstances. This is the benchmark case that we confront with the organizational ecology perspective. Hrebiniak and Joyce (1985) and Frederickson and Iaquinto (1989) are but two examples of arguments that reflect on the flexibility-inertia debate in the strategic management literature. 4 Again, there is more in IO than this standard argument, examples being the models that take notice of commitment strategies and competitive escalation. However, all these addenda to the standard story still assume profit maximization to be the firm's decision rule.
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For the sake of clarity, we ignore these subtleties here, briefly returning to alternative modeling opportunities in the appraisal. 5 Winter (1975) opposes this argument. With Nelson he developed an alternative framework: evolutionary economics (Nelson and Winter, 1982) . This theory emphasizes the role of organizational routines, which is a concept akin to OE's relative inertia. However, in the evolutionary economics argument changing routines -and hence organizational adaptation -still impede failure rates. Therefore, the divergence from economic rationality reasoning is only a matter of degree. For the sake of brevity, evolutionary economics is ignored here. Winter (1990) relates this theory to OE. 6 This argument illustrates that the notions of profit maximization, organizational flexibility, and cost efficiency are intricately related. Theoretically, all combinations are thinkable (e.g. a nonprofit-maximizing but cost-efficient firm). However, introducing these subtleties in this paper would unnecessarily complicate the argument. 7 Rotemberg (1994) offers an interesting model in which unorthodox motives are introduced at the work floor rather than at the management level. Rotemberg, too, deviates from the extreme rationality assumption by introducing what he calls rational altruism, which is well known from the work of Nobel prizewinner Gary Becker. The key finding is that workers' altruism (tendency to cooperate) is rational (utility-maximizing) if workers' payments depend upon joint profit. So, Rotemberg's setting is completely different from this paper's model. Rotemberg analyzes team work on the internal work floor of a firm, whereas the present paper focuses on managerial behavior in the face of external competition. However, the introduction of work-floor behavior in a game-theoretic model of OE is an interesting avenue for future research (Murnighan, 1994) . 8 Note that both van Lier and van Witteloostuijn (1993) and van Witteloostuijn (1998) assume that a firm derives utility from absolute sales: that is, u t = w t + ␣s t . This change in interpretation leaves the mathematics unaffected, though. 9
The present model differs substantially from previous nonprofit-maximizing models on which it is based (Vickers, 1985; Fershtman and Judd, 1987; Sklivas, 1987; Basu, 1995) in two ways. First, it explores the consequences of differences in managerial inertia between firms on equilibrium outcomes by introducing ␣-heterogeneity. Second, it explicitly incorporates firms' exit (i.e. organizational mortality). As a result, the equilibrium outcomes presented in this paper have, to our knowledge, not been explored in this literature. Moreover, given potential firm asymmetry, this paper moves beyond Van Witteloostuijn (1998) by calculating the optimal level of downward inertia (see Figure 5 ) and interpreting the model in terms of OE. 10 The n-firm case is explored in van Lier and van Witteloostuijn (1993) . Basically, the results remain qualitatively identical when moving from a duopoly setting to Cournot competition with n (n Ͼ 2) firms. 11 In van Lier and van Witteloostuijn (2000) , we take the traditional Cournot equilibrium output volume as the benchmark, rather than s t -1 . Analytically, this is equivalent to what is presented in the main text. 12 Analytical results are reported in van Lier and van Witteloostuijn (2002) . For this paper's purposes, with an emphasis on the consequences of demand dynamics, the outcomes of simulation experiments are much more revealing. 13 This assumption of constant demand implies that the discussion of the second model can be limited to key analytical results, as dynamic simulation experiments would add nothing to the static equilibrium outcomes reported here. 14 Moreover, for ␣ H Ͻ ␣ i Ͻ ␣ R managerial inertia does also pay, albeit suboptimally. 15 Case 4 is not discussed in this paper. For examples we refer to van Witteloostuijn (1998) . 16 Another interesting issue is how all this relates to the current popularity of downsizing strategies, and the consequences of the latter for organizational performance. For reasons of space limitations, this issue is not explored here.
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